Application which had been made under the streamlined procedure set out in Part 2 of Practice Direction 11A for authorisation of deprivation of liberty was not the correct procedure in this case.

Application for the P to have fitted an intrauterine contraceptive device at the same time as she undergoes a caesarean section. The application was granted.

Application by the Hospital Trust that it was in the P's best interests to use all reasonable and proportionate measures, including physical restraint, to administer insulin to him. The court made the order sought.

The P suffers from type 1 diabetes and at the time of the application was an inpatient at the hospital following a deterioration in his physical health arising from his diagnosis. At this time the P was non-compliant with his medication regime which involved regular daily insulin injections to manage his condition. The application was made to be able to restrain the P if necessary, otherwise without medication he would die.
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The court held that there was reason to believe that the P lacked capacity in relation to the issues concerning his treatment and considered that it was in his best interests that he be treated in accordance with the plan that has been laid out  by the Trust. The court was also satisfied that it was necessary and proportionate, and in the P's best interests to make the order that reasonable restraint can be used in order to administer treatment.

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The court agreed with the local authority who had adopted the decision and approach in not seeking to facilitate the P's contact with sex workers either here or abroad.

Several applications were brought by the PG where the common theme across these applications was the expression by the donor, in the Lasting Power of Attorney, of an intention that the appointed attorney use the donor's funds to benefit someone other than the donor. ​

The issue in this appeal was whether it is within the scope of parental responsibility to consent to living arrangements for a 16 or 17-year-old child which would otherwise amount to a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), in particular where the child lacks the mental capacity to make the decision for himself.

​For the purposes of determining the fundamental capacity of an individual in relation to sexual relations, the information relevant to the decision for the purposes of section 3(1) of the MCA 2005 does not include information that, absent consent of a sexual partner, attempting sexual relations with another person is liable to breach the criminal law.

​Declaration regarding capacity and orders for serious medical treatment relating to the P, a woman who was in the advanced stages of her pregnancy, were made.

Application by the Trust for permission to amputate the P's leg was granted.

The court had to decide whether the assessment of capacity to make decisions about diabetic management is one macro-decision which encompasses all of the many micro-decisions that the P is required to make when managing her diabetes, or, whether the P's capacity should be assessed in respect of each micro-decision or group of micro-decisions.

The P is a 64-year-old woman with a personality disorder with components of different types and has an emotionally unstable paranoid histrionic and dependant personality disorder. She also suffers from a number of physical health conditions, including hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and unstable diabetes, which has led for instance to her having a below-the-knee amputation. Generally, she is compliant in the administration of the insulin, but not compliant in relation to other forms of medication. The management of her healthcare has been increasingly very difficult. Over four days in June 2018, Cohen J heard several applications concerning the P, concerning her capacity to make decisions about her residence and care. There are occasions when the P has the capacity to make micro-decisions in respect of her diabetes and occasions when she does not, i.e. that her capacity fluctuates. This hearing was to determine whether, when deciding if the P has the capacity to manage her diabetes, this is to be considered as one macro-decision, a series of micro-decisions which need to be made on a regular ongoing basis, or as a group of decisions.

The court approached the matter on the basis of the experts' conclusions, logically, legally and practically, and concluded that it was a macro-decision, and the P lacked capacity to take the macro-decision. The issue of fluctuating capacity, therefore, simply did not arise.

Read the full text of the judgment on Bailii