SM, an adult woman born in 1997 with severe learning disability, catatonia, major depression and autism, and lacked capacity. In her current placement, she could be aggressive to herself, others and her environment, required skilled 2:1 support, and had repeatedly and inconsistently expressed wishes to move elsewhere, though no suitable alternative placement had been identified despite extensive searches. The question for this hearing was whether SM's care arrangements amounted to a deprivation of her liberty given her expressed wishes to move elsewhere. The LA argued they did not, a view SM's legal representative disagreed with.

HHJ Williscroft, after reviewing the relevant law including the Supreme Court decision in AGNI [2026] UKSC 16 , found SM was not objectively confined or restricted, viewing her arrangements as ordinary, skilled support enabling her daily life, community access and family contact rather than containment, and rejected her representative's submission that SM's repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction transformed her lived experience into confinement. Although both parties agreed SM's consent was invalid, the absence of any objective element meant no deprivation of liberty arose. 

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This judgment arose from seven applications by professional property and affairs deputies seeking clarification of the Court of Protection's jurisdiction to authorise them to manage "Direct Payments" made under four separate statutory schemes (NHS, Care Act, SEN and Children Act Regulations) so that a person's care needs could be met without the public body itself commissioning services. The applications followed the decision in Lumb which held that managing NHS Direct Payments involved welfare-type decision-making falling outside a deputy's general property and affairs authority. The applicant deputies, who were already managing such payments, unanimously argued Lumb was wrongly decided. In this application, the Public Guardian and Official Solicitor (as amicus) were joined.

After reviewing each of the cases, and answering 24 questions agreed between the parties, HHJ Hilder upholds the decision in Lumb and at [199-202] concludes:

"[199] …..I have concluded that management of Direct Payments in accordance with the requirements of each and all of these schemes requires some decision-making of a welfare-type. 

[200] On the way to reaching this conclusion, I have determined that management of Direct Payments cannot properly be regarded as a routine aspect of quotidian management of an estate. Rather, it is a complex set of specific, identifiable tasks and obligations to be regarded as sui generis and not within the meaning of ‘general’ authority in a standard- terms property and affairs deputyship appointment. The conclusion that management of Direct Payments involves some decision-making of a welfare-type puts this beyond doubt. 

[201] It is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection to appoint a deputy with authority to make decisions of a type which involve a mixture of both the property and affairs, and the health and welfare, streams of the Court’s jurisdiction. The separation of work streams in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and in court processes is only a matter of workability and convenience. It does not reflect how people lead their lives, and it does not restrict the Court’s ability to respond to lived experience. The authority which is needed to manage Direct Payments within deputyship is set out, in the terms of a draft order, in Schedule 1 to this judgment. 

[202] In order to obtain appropriate deputyship authority, an application to the Court of Protection will be necessary. That application may be included in a first application for deputyship appointment, or it may be made subsequently by a deputy who is already appointed. The information which should be provided in support of the application is summarised in Schedule 2 to this order. As always, each application will be particular to its own facts. So the matters listed in Schedule 2 should not be regarded as exhaustive. If a particular case requires provision of additional information, that should be provided with the application and may otherwise be directed by the Court."    

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ST, a 98-year-old woman, suffered a severe stroke in December 2025 causing left-sided weakness, dysphagia and significant cognitive-communication impairment, for which she received clinically assisted nutrition and hydration via a nasogastric tube. The Health Board applied for declarations that ST lacked capacity and that removing the NG tube in favour of a palliative care plan, ideally at home, was in her best interests. Her son, MB, who cared for her and lived with her, opposed the plane and insisted ST was recovering and communicating meaningfully. He also cited his mother's wishes, who was a Catholic, though everything should be done to prolong life.

After reviewing the medical evidence Mrs Justice Morgan preferred that of clinicians to MB's. ST was declining rather than improving, found the nasogastric tube distressing and had expressed wishes to die at home. Although ST's Catholic faith carried significant weight, it had to be balanced with her wishes to return home and there was a closing window in which this could be done safely. Morgan J therefore concluded that the Health Board's plan was in ST's best interests.

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In January 2020, FHR, a 28-year-old man, suffered a catastrophic brain injury as a result of an attempt to hang himself. He was left blind, mostly paralysed and in a prolonged disorder of consciousness. The ICB was seeking a ruling on whether continued CANH was in his best interests. His mother and father opposed withdrawal, relying on evidence of possible awareness by FHR and citing Islamic teaching against withdrawing nutrition. The single joint expert considered FHR was in a permanent vegetative with no prospect of recovery.

After setting out the long history of the litigation, the legal framework and the medical evidence before him, Mr Justice McKendrick concludes that is not in FHR's best interest to continue with the treatment saying at [151] that

"on the balance of probabilities, [FHR] can never recover a quality of life that he personally would value."  
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He experienced pain and discomfort from his care regime, and derived no benefit, pleasure or communicative awareness from his existence. The judge then ordered palliative care, ideally at home and directed that the transparency order lapse 21 days after his death.

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UJ, a 45-year-old man, suffered a severe traumatic brain injury after attempting suicide with a crossbow in April 2026. The resulting injuries have left him seriously ill and doctors considered that an operation would allow them to assess whether he could regain some quality of life. Without the surgery he would continue to decline and eventually die. Members of his family opposed the treatment largely as they felt prolonging life in these circumstances would accord with UJ's wishes as he was always active and independent. His mother, after initially agreeing with the doctors, also came to that conclusion. 

Mrs Justice Theis weighed the sanctity of life against UJ's likely wishes. Although the surgery offered UJ's only chance of meaningful recovery, there was uncertainty as to what recovery would look like and how dependent UJ would be. Acknowledging this was a finely balanced decision, she gave considerable weight to the family's evidence that UJ would not want to live dependent and disabled so she refused the  application.

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HH is 30 years old and at the time of the hearing 37 weeks pregnant. She has a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and has been detained under s3 of the MHA since June 2026. The Trusts, one responsible for HH's medical care and the other for her mental health, were seeking declarations that HH lacks capacity to conduct proceedings and make decisions about her obstetric care. If capacity is lacking, then they were seeking further declarations that it is in her best interests to deliver the baby by elective caesarean section if necessary. 

Theis J, the Vice President, after reviewing the medical evidence and the legal framework, agrees at [50] that HH lacks capacity and allows the applications. While acknowledging HH's wish to have a vaginal birth she states at [55] "where there is an immediate risk to HH, staff or others there may be no alternative but to proceed to a caesarean section under general anaesthetic"

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This hearing arises from long running proceedings disputes involving various members of the Hinduja family. It is an application by one of the family concerning documents disclosed into the Court of Protection proceedings and whether they can be used in other proceedings, and if so on what terms. Bacon J, sitting as a nominated judge in the Court of Protection, sums up the complexities in [3]
 
"The ostensible simplicity of the question of whether documents disclosed into one set of proceedings can be used in other proceedings is belied in this case by three complicating features: first, the documents in issue are covered by an intricate set of restrictions and protections arising under various different orders and procedural rules; secondly, the documents are sought to be used in two different sets of actual or contemplated proceedings in different jurisdictions; and thirdly, the terms of Sanjay's application have materially changed since it was first made."

After reviewing the relevant legal principles and the documents themselves he classifies them in six subsets, two of which were not privileged.  The conclusions for each subset are set out in [100].

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NP is a 67-year-old with longstanding paranoid schizophrenia and lives at a care home. She was diagnosed with grade 3 breast cancer in September 2025. It was agreed NP lacks capacity to make decisions about her treatment. Having initially considered surgery, a CT scan confirmed the cancer had metastasised, making systemic drug treatment the only option. The court was asked to determine whether it was in NP's best interests to undertake a trial of inhibitors alongside her existing drug treatment which may have offered increased life expectancy but came with a risk of more serious side effects.

David Rees KC, sitting as a Tier 3 judge, decided it was not in NP's best interests to commence the trial. While acknowledging the case was finely balanced, the key factor was the increased risk of sepsis or serious infection, which meant the inhibitors were more likely to shorten NP's life than extend it. NP's current good quality of life weighed heavily against that risk. He also makes observations about allocation of such cases at [39].

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