CL v Swansea Bay University Health Board & Ors [2024] EWCOP 22

Application for permission to appeal, and appeal if granted,  by CL against discharge of a previous order appointing CL as LL’s deputy for personal welfare

The underlying facts are set out in Swansea Bay University Health Board v P & Ors [2023] EWCOP 67.  In this further appeal, the Vice President, Theis J, identifies the central issue as is the inter-relationship between s16(7) and (8) MCA and considers three grounds of appeal; that the Judge was wrong to reject CL's arguments over statutory interpretation; had failed to recognise the difference between granting a deputyship and discharging a validly appointed one; and had failed to carry out a detailed and comprehensive best interests analysis when discharging the deputyship.

Theis J granted permission to appeal for all three grounds but rejected each one. Broadly the submissions by the appellant concerning statutory interpretation attempted to define matters too narrowly where a broader approach was required to allow the court to decide in P's best interests. Further the judge had extensive knowledge of the case and had considered all the relevant matters. At [87] Theis J states the judge was entitled to decide in 

his careful and well-reasoned judgment that s16(7) provides the court with a broad discretion to vary or discharge a deputyship order and is not limited in its application, save that it is subject to the provisions of s16(3), namely the principles in s1 and s4 best interests. Section 16(8) is a non-exhaustive provision which supplements s16(7).